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Abstract: What is the material context of constitutional order? The purpose of 
this paper is to offer an answer to that question by sketching a theory of the 
material constitution. After examining the historical origins of the material turn 
in the interwar constitutional theories of Heller and Mortati, the paper outlines 
the basic elements of the material constitution, specifying its four ordering 
forces. These are political unity, the dominant form of which remains the 
modern nation-state; a set of institutions, including but not limited to formal 
governmental branches such as courts, parliaments, executives, 
administrations; a network of social relations, including class interests and 
social movements, and a set of fundamental political objectives (or teloi). 
These forces constitute the material substance and dynamic process of 
constitutional ordering. They are not external to the formal constitution but are 
in internal relation with it. Because these ordering forces are multiple, and in 
tension with one another, there is no single determining factor of 
constitutional development. Neither is order as such guaranteed. The conflict 
that characterizes the modern human condition might but need not be 
internalised by the process of constitutional ordering. The theory of the 
material constitution offers an account of the basic elements of this process as 






Constitutionalism in Europe is suffering a certain fatigue. Due in part to North-
American influence, constitutional enquiry had become narrowly focused on the 
protection of constitutional norms and the enforcement of individual rights 
through the judicial process. The special role played by constitutional courts and 
the German Constitutional Court in particular underlined an increasingly ‘juridical’ 
approach to constitutionalism.1 If the constitution was what the court said it was, 
the task of the constitutional lawyer was to provide normative and hermeneutic 
guidance for judicial reasoning. This coincided with the broader judicialisation of 
constitutional politics, aptly characterised by Ran Hirschl as ‘juristocracy’, but fully 
embraced by legal constitutionalists as the best institutional arrangement for 
holding the constitution together and protecting individual rights from political 
abuse.2  
                                                     
  
1 See e.g. C. Möllers, ‘We are (afraid of) the people’, in M. Loughlin and N. Walker (eds.) The 
Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constitutional Power and Constitutional Form (Oxford University Press, 
2007) 87 – 107.   
2 R Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (Harvard 
University Press 2004).  
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The theoretical hegemony of this approach, appositely labelled 
‘normativism’,3 can be traced from the beginning of the post-war period through 
to a triumphant pinnacle at the ‘end of history’ marked by the fall of the Berlin 
wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. But in the wake of 9/11 and the return 
of states of emergency and states of exception, normativism begins to appear 
vulnerable. With the inception of the Euro-crisis, the rule of law crisis and more 
recently the migrant crisis in Europe, it starts to look untenable.4 These critical 
conjunctures show that the normative constitution in general and the protection 
of rights through judicial means in particular are not self-sustaining. Constitutional 
history reclaims front stage, if it had ever fully left the theatre. The repercussions 
of course extend beyond constitutional theorising, as the ‘end of history narrative’ 
is discarded, disowned by its inventor, and non-liberal political theory returns to 
the fore. 
It is no surprise that by the beginning of the millennium a new wave of 
‘political constitutionalism’ had entered the stage. 5  But, with some notable 
exceptions, this stream of scholarship remained normative, reductive, formalistic, 
wedded to individualistic premises, and incapable of offering explanatory 
conceptual accounts of constitutionalism or of constitutional development. 6  It 
restricted itself to claims about the superiority of parliaments over courts at 
holding the executive to account and at determining rights disputes, positioning 
itself normatively against the legal constitutionalist’s faith in judicial reasoning, but 
eschewing issues of constituent power and state theory.  
In short, political constitutionalism was insufficiently material.7 It remained 
mute in the face of renewed constitutional crises and political-economic crises of 
the state and the inter-state system, and impervious to the increasingly fraught 
nature of the social relations undergirding them. Political and legal 
constitutionalists alike neglected the material conditions for the emergence and 
development of a constitutional order, and the material changes that prompt the 
suspension or modification of formal constitutional norms. To understand these 
phenomena requires attention to the underlying material context, to the basic 
political and social conditions of possibility of constitutionalism and the dynamics 
                                                     
3 See M. Loughlin, ‘The Concept of Constituent Power’ (2014) 13 European Journal of Political 
Theory 218; M. Loughlin and S. Tschorne, ‘Public Law’ in The Routledge Handbook of Interpretive 
Studies (Routledge, 2016).  
4 See e.g. J. White, ‘Authority after Emergency Rule’ (2015) 78 Modern Law Review 585; C 
Gearty, ‘The State of Freedom in Europe’ (2015) 21 European Law Journal 706. More generally, 
see V. Ramraj ‘No Doctrine More Pernicious? Emergencies and the Limits of Legality’ in 
Ramraj (ed.) Emergencies and the Limits of Legality (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 3 – 29.  
5 Key works are J. Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford University Press, 1999); A. Tomkins, 
Our Republican Constitution (Hart, 2005); R. Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism (Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
6 Cf K. Ewing, ‘The Resilience of the Political Constitution’ (2013) 14 German Law Journal 2111; 
O. Beaud, ‘Reframing a debate amongst Americans: Contextualising a Moral Philosophy of 
Law’ (2009) International Journal of Constitutional Law 53 – 68.  
7 Cf. P. Minkinnen, ‘Political Constitutionalism vs. Political Constitutional Theory: Law, Power 
and Politics’ (2015) 11 International Journal of Constitutional Law 585 – 610.  
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of constitutional change. Otherwise constitutional theory will have little to say 
about the most important challenges to constitutional ordering, whether in the 
shape of the existential crisis of the Eurozone, the fracturing of the political unity 
of the modern state, or the return of anti-systemic political and social movements.  
The material constitution, it is argued here, is not grasped merely by 
supplementing judicial with political analysis, by exposing the significance of 
parliamentary authority and the role of executive powers in the governing 
arrangements of the polity. It is grasped only by properly grappling with the 
deeper societal context in which formal constitutional development is embedded 
(or, as the case may be, dis-embedded). It is the purpose of this article to offer a 
starting point for conceptual enquiry into this material constitution.  
The material constitution is clearly complex. To manage complexity and gain 
an analytical purchase, we identify four key (if not necessarily exclusive) ‘layers’ of 
the constitution: political unity, the dominant form of which remains the modern 
nation-state; a set of institutions, including but not limited to formal governmental 
branches such as courts, parliaments, executives, administrations; a network of 
social relations, including class interests and social movements, and a set of 
fundamental political objectives (or teloi). These make up the four ordering forces of the 
constitution.  
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we situate the material constitution in 
the historical context of its earlier iteration, the interwar constitutional theories of 
Heller and Mortati (part 2). Although departing from the normativism of Kelsen 
and the decisionism of Schmitt, and offering important insights on which to build, 
Heller and Mortati fail to provide a full theoretical framework for the material 
constitution, which needs therefore to be reconstructed (part 3). We then begin 
this task by outlining each of the four ordering forces of the material constitution 
in turn (part 4). Finally, we conclude (part 5) by presenting the material 
constitution neither as a field of extra-juristic knowledge, nor as a straightforward 
conveyor-belt of legal norms but as internally and dynamically related to the 
formal constitution.  
 
2. SITUATING THE MATERIAL CONSTITUTION: THE OLD 
TRADITION 
The notion of the constitution in a material sense (Verfassung im materiellen Sinne) as 
distinct from the written document can be found in the work of Hans Kelsen. 8 
But for Kelsen the material constitution amounts merely to the set of norms that 
authorises law-making, law-interpreting and law-applying powers. He offers an 
entirely formal definition, ‘those norms that refer to the supreme organs and […] 
to the relation between subjects and the power of the State’.9 This accords with 
Kelsen’s claim that the state is nothing but the ‘personification’ of a legal order, 
                                                     
8 H. Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre (Springer, 1925) 252. 
9 Ibidem, 252-253. Later, Kelsen will confirm his position on the material constitution in 
General Theory of Law and State (Harvard University Press, 1945) 124-125. 
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and his simple assumption of the ‘identity’ of law and state.10  He rejects any 
account of the political or social relations behind these norms or of the state as a 
politico-juristic or sociological entity.11 We thus need to move beyond Kelsen in 
order to capture the underlying material order of the constitution.  
  To begin this, we can turn to less formalist theories that emerge from 
Kelsen’s contemporaries in the interwar period, to authors who rejected pure 
normativism, but who also rejected the pure decisionism associated with Carl 
Schmitt (although, as we examine in the next section, Schmitt’s own institutionalist 
turn offers some important insights). Our points of reference are the works of 
Herman Heller and Costantino Mortati, both jurists who were steeped in the state 
theory and institutionalism of their time. Methodologically, this allowed them to 
thematise the link between constitutional order and society in a way that avoids 
the orthodox liberal juxtaposition between law and politics, or between State and 
civil society. Forged in the crucible of interwar Germany and Italy, their theories 
must be understood with those turbulent contexts in mind. But they represent, in 
nuce, the concern to develop a fuller material account of the constitution and are 
worth exploring in their own right.    
 
(a) Heller: Political Democracy and Social Homogeneity 
 
If Kelsen and Schmitt were two archetypal thinkers of normativism and 
decisionism respectively, then Herman Heller was their neglected interlocutor who 
offered a ‘third alternative.’12 For Heller, a dialectical approach to the constitution 
is necessary because political power always aspires to the legal form posited and 
secured by the organs of the state, just as legal form requires the support of 
political power to sustain it in actuality. Heller’s alternative depended not just on 
presenting law and politics as interdependent, however, but as driven by a social 
dynamic, in the sense that the state - or any constitutional order –must not only 
seek legitimacy or ethical justification but also convey the realistic possibility of 
some success in this task.13 The nature of this ethical grounding is not precisely 
                                                     
10 H. Kelsen, ibid, 181 
11 See, for a discussion of the difference between formal and material constitution in Kelsen’s 
work, L. Vinx, Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law (Oxford University Press, 2007) 158-160. Vinx 
has also shown that by reading together Kelsen’s political theory and legal philosophy, it is 
possible to connect his pure theory of law to his concerns about social order. Vinx is right to 
identify Kelsen’s legal philosophy as the complement to his theory of democracy and as a way 
to understand lawmaking as a channel of composition among different and fragmented 
interests. Our conception of the material constitution, outlined below, rejects this 
proceduralism. 
12 H. Heller, ‘Political Democracy and Social Homogeneity’ in A. Jacobson and B. Schlink (eds) 
Weimar: A Jurisprudence of Crisis (University of California Press, 2000) 272.  
13 Because of this relationship between law and politics, and ‘on account of its social function’, 
Heller argues that ‘each state power must strive not only for legality in the legal technical sense, 
but also, for the sake of its self-preservation, for an ethical justification of its positive legal or 
conventional norms, i.e. for legitimacy’ ibid, 272. See further Dyzenhaus, ‘Hermann Heller and 
the Legitimacy of Legality’ (1996) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 641 – 666.  
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specified, but two things can be stated at the outset: it goes to the democratic 
quality of a regime and the prospect of attaining some degree of socio-economic 
equality.  
The constitution, according to Heller, depends on a material order. It is 
formed not only out of legislative action, tradition, and political expediency, but 
also constellations of social and economic power. 14  Viewed historically, the 
constitution might then appear as a mere modus vivendi, the result of a political 
compromise or fortuitous balance of interests. But for Heller, it must have a 
normative quality.15 
‘Efficacy and validity, the “is” and the “ought” of the constitution’ must 
be ‘logically distinguished’, but, ‘they nevertheless apply to the same constitutional 
reality, in which the statement of one always at the same time asserts the other.’16 
This can equally be applied to the subject of the constitution-giving power, the 
pouvoir constituant. The pouvoir constituant - whether ‘the prince’ or ‘the people’ - only 
has the power of constitution-giving on the basis of a normative authority.17  
This normative quality is framed not in the (Kelsenian) sense of 
authorisation by a previously valid norm (which would only lead to the infinite 
regression closed by the Grundnorm), but on the basis of ethical principles in the 
service of the common good.18 Rejecting both Schmitt’s ‘norm-less power’ and 
Kelsen’s ‘powerless norm’, Heller strives for a middle-way.19 He argues that the 
constitution requires at least one decisive section of those subject to its power to 
comply with it, not just out of self-interest or habituation, but because they accept 
it, without explaining what section of the population would be decisive or what 
acceptance means. 20   
But by linking constitutional authority with social acceptance, 
constitutional enquiry is forced to confront a theory of democracy. ‘The law of 
democracy’ after all, Heller notes, ‘attributes the formation of state power to ‘the 
people’’.21 This was the case explicitly with the Weimer constitution itself. And in 
practice, it guaranteed universal suffrage for the first time in German history.  
                                                     
14 Heller above, 275-6 
15 ibid, 277. Heller notes that the idea of the constituent power can as much be a reactionary as 
a revolutionary doctrine.  
16 ibid, 277 
17 ‘The prince possesses constitution-giving power, not because he has it existentially, but only 
on the ‘basis of the normative order of hereditary succession, and hence, as legal power… 
[W]ithout a normative act, a mass of human beings has neither a will capable of decision, nor 
power capable of action and at the very least it has no authority whatsoever.’ Ibid, 277.  
18 Thus ‘to be more than a highly unstable factual situation of superior power, to be valid as 
lawful order, a constitution needs justification from ethical principles of law.’ ibid, 278. 
Although highlighting the contingence of the ethical order (justice can only be realized by the 
‘individual conscience’), we are given little guidance as to how to identify it. 
19 For extended discussion see D. Dyzenhaus, Legality and Legitimacy: Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen 
and Hermann Heller in Weimar (Oxford University Press, 1997).  
20 Cf. M. Wilkinson, ‘Is Law Morally Risky: Alienation, Acceptance and Hart’s Concept of Law 
View’ (2010) OJLS 441 – 466.  
21 273. 
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Democracy, for Heller, is not about an ‘identity’ between rulers and ruled, 
but it does require a relative social homogeneity. 22  This can undoubtedly have a 
cultural, religious or nationalistic element. But ultimately it is a social and 
economic category. What is decisive is not the ideological superstructure but the 
reality of socio-economic relations. 23 There must exist a certain degree of socio-
economic equality – or the prospect of such - for the people as a plurality 
consciously to form itself into the people as unity. Otherwise, Heller warned, ‘the 
most radical formal equality becomes the most radical inequality, and formal 
democracy becomes the dictatorship of the ruling class.’24  
The task of political democracy is to manage social heterogeneity and 
social conflict. There can be no existential assumption of a concrete political 
order. Heller firmly rejects Schmitt’s authoritarian state, a substantive unity based 
ultimately on the political-existential logic of who is ‘friend and enemy’, and in 
extremis, grounded by the sovereign (‘he who decides on the exception’). This is 
too ‘top-down’ in its view of constitutional ordering, ignores the dynamics of 
political will-formation, and comes into direct contradiction with democracy, 
‘which is supposed to be a conscious process of the formation of political unity 
from bottom to top’.25 
For Heller, political unity is not a bare fact of existential recognition of  
‘we’ and ‘them’; it is formed, constructed, and mediated through the political 
process, which channels competing claims over the common good.26 For this to 
happen, institutions, and political parties in particular, are essential. 27 
‘Homogeneity’ is something that daily must be formed anew, Heller approving 
Renan’s famous account of national unity as ‘un plebiscite de toujours.’28 
The essence of political unity remains elusive, resistant to any 
straightforward empirical analysis, political resolution, extraordinary, or extra-
constitutional decision. 29  And since the social structure remains necessarily 
                                                     
22 Not only Schmitt but also Kelsen argues that a certain homogeneity is necessary for the 
democratic polity, yet Kelsen explicitly rejects the need for social equality. See H. Kelsen, ‘On 
the Essence and Value of Democracy’ in A. Jacobson and B. Schlink (eds), Weimar: A 
Jurisprudence of Crisis, cit., 84-108. 
23 Heller, above 261. Heller recognizes that the bourgeoisie as a class will attempt to resurrect 
ideologies, including those of nationalism and of monarchy, in order to maintain its own 
position of power amid the eternal ‘cycle of elites’, ibid 261. 
24 Ibid, 262 (a factor which enables him to distinguish the European social problem from the 
‘Negro Question’ in America. He notes that ‘nothing is more characteristic of the social 
disparity which threatens our democracy than the attempt to recast the economic disparity into 
an anthropological one’, ibid 264) 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid, 260. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid.  
29 Heller: ‘One cannot say definitively how this “we-consciousness” is produced and destroyed. 
All attempts to find the impulse for this consciousness in a single sphere of life have failed and 
must fail. All that we can rightly know is that in each epoch a correspondence between social 
being and consciousness – in other words a societal form – emerges, ’ ibid, 261. 
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antagonistic,30 Heller rejects the utopian socialism of those on the Marxist wing of 
the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) as well as the conservatism of his 
authoritarian opponents.  
But turning from his state theory to his political commentary, we get a 
sense of the significance of socio-economic equality for the stability of the 
constitutional order. Heller signals direct opposition to Schmitt regarding the 
impact of the domestic political economy of late Weimar on the breakdown of its 
liberal-democratic regime, as it edged towards authoritarianism before finally 
collapsing in 1933. Just one year before, Heller took stock of the threat of 
authoritarianism, a strong conservative state asserting itself in Germany to remedy 
the perceived impotence of liberal democracy and in particular the weakness and 
disorder of its parliamentary regime. This brief phase of ‘president’s cabinets’ from 
1930–33 witnessed the bypassing of parliamentary authority, government through 
emergency decrees, drastic cuts to state expenditure, internal devaluation, and a 
deflationary policy of Germany’s central bank, under pressure of servicing its 
debts.31  
The turn to a new authoritarianism is not accounted for by the physical or 
metaphysical allure of the powerful national state and its capacity to restore 
German pride, national unity and international standing, or ‘a belief in the miracles 
wrought by a dictatorship’. 32 The issues of reparations and of military parity with 
France had already been dealt with, or were close to being resolved by the weak 
Weimar republic. It was, in any case, as Heller notes, the authoritarian German 
state that had lost the First World War and should have been responsible for the 
humiliation that followed.  
What characterised the new authoritarian state, for Heller, was the domain 
from which it claimed to extract itself. It was necessary to look, first and foremost, 
at ‘the economic order’. Those, like Carl Schmitt, advocating the authoritarian 
state as an answer to liberal democracy’s weakness were not proffering it to deal 
with the problem of social-economic inequality.33  On the contrary, they were 
                                                     
30 ibid. 
31 See Eberhard Kolb, The Weimar Republic 2nd edition tr. P. S. Falla and R. J. Park (Routledge, 
2005) 116 - 135. According to Kolb it was supported not only by the Right but by large part of 
the centre, as well as powerful economic interest groups and the army faction. The fateful 
transition to authoritarianism, anti-Marxist and anti-parliamentarian in outlook, was coolly 
planned  ‘and with the intention of drastically altering the constitutional system and the balance 
of social forces in favor of old elites of the army, bureaucracy and big business’, above at 117 – 
118. 
32 H. Heller, ‘Authoritarian Liberalism’ tr. B. Paulson, S. Paulson and A. Somek  (2015 [1933]) 
European Law Journal 295 – 302, 296.  
33  Heller notes that there could be no ‘metaphysico-religious’ foundation for the state in 
Germany because of its religious heterogeneity. This also prevents the State, in Heller’s view, 
from being able to impose a form of cultural community (Kulturgemeinschaft). The national 
socialist goal of bringing about cultural homogeneity through an authoritarian racial 
community is considered by Heller too idealistic in the eyes of the German population to be 
likely to succeed. He briskly – in hindsight, at least, all too briskly – also dismisses as not even 
serious the idea that the authoritarian state be used to promote a particular racial ideology. 
Heller, ‘Authoritarian Liberalism’, above.  
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advocating a state, rhetorically at least, that would distance itself from the 
economic realm. Demanding a separation of the state from the economy would 
not have come easy to the ‘total-authoritarian’ Schmitt, Heller suggests. Schmitt’s 
solution was to distinguish between the state that interferes in the economy, which 
is in fact a weak state, and the ‘qualitatively total state’, which draws a sharp line of 
separation vis-à-vis the economy, but uses a heavy fist militarily and mass 
manipulation in cultural domains. 34  The strong state feigns to sever its 
connections with the economy – outside certain limited areas of state monopoly - 
to demonstrate its overwhelming authority. 35   
Heller characterises this new conservatism as marshalled in defence of 
capitalism against social democracy, reversing a 19th century position when 
conservatism had protected the feudal order against capitalism.36 Representing a 
further development of national liberalism, it is, Heller concludes, ‘to be addressed 
as authoritarian liberalism’, its liberalism now economic in substance.37  Rather 
than strengthening national identity to resist the pressures of modernization, 
bonds of solidarity must be ‘loosened’, even destroyed, to resist the forces of 
socialism.38 Above all, the objective of the authoritarian liberals, who effectively 
‘put Hitler into power’, was the elimination of social democracy from politics 
through neutering its parliamentary authority.39 
Defence of the capitalist form of the economy in an era of mass politics 
combined with increasing class consciousness required a strong state. 40   It 
required not laissez-faire but planning – not the separation of politics and 
economics, but their intertwinement. This kind of ‘neo-liberalism’, remarks Heller, 
could never be maintained in democratic form, however, not least because of the 
ninety per-cent that are forced to live in abject poverty. In reality, Heller 
prophetically notes, the state will have to act with heavy doses of authoritarian 
socialism in order to maintain social order, however much conducted sotto voce 
so as to maintain the appearance of strict market justice. This will be done in a way 
that forecloses the route of parliamentary, political contestation that might 
democratically legitimate redistribution from the bottom-up. His conclusion is 
                                                     
34 The term total state later became used by Forsthoff to polemicise against the substantively 
empty liberal state. See further K. Tribe, Strategies of Economic Order: German Economic Discourse 
1750 – 1950 (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 179 – 180.  
35  Schmitt defends this authoritarian liberalism in his address to the Langnamverein. A 
translation is appended in R. Cristi, Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism (University of 
Wales, 1998). Schmitt permitted its reprinting at least twice, suggesting for Scheuerman that it 
was a text that was of some significance to him, see Carl Schmitt and the End of Law (Rowman 
and Littlefield, 1999) 288.   
36 On the significance of the Deutsche Nationale Volkspartei, the DNVP, see Kolb, above, 116 – 
120.  
37 Heller, ‘Authoritarian Liberalism’, above, 299.  
38 ibid. 
39 Polanyi, above, at 246.  
40 The authoritarian liberal, Heller remarks, fights against the welfare state with one hand 
‘whilst subsiding large banks, large industry, and large agricultural enterprise’ with the other. 
Above, 300. 
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implicit but clear. Once the democratic route to social homogeneity is abandoned, 
the road to dictatorship is open.  
 
(b) Mortati: Constitution in the Material Sense and the Governing Function 
 
Costantino Mortati, a contemporary of Heller, was writing in a similar context of 
profound transformation of the State (in the Italian case, the consolidation of the 
new Fascist regime). Like Heller, Mortati was inspired by the coeval work on legal 
institutionalism. 41  And Mortati was similarly troubled by the polarisation of 
positions illustrated by the debate between Kelsen and Schmitt, such juxtaposition 
detrimental to comprehending the intimate link between the formation and 
development of the constitution and societal order.42 But, unlike Heller, Mortati 
was inclined to adopt a realist interpretation of constitutional order.  
Mortati’s first seminal works aimed at capturing the constitutional reality 
of the new regimes which emerged after Word War I. These works, denouncing 
the limits of a formalist conception of the constitution, addressed the governing 
function, the discretion of administrative action and the constitution in the 
material sense. 43  It is not by chance that Mortati’s reflections began with a 
discussion of the governing function, focused on the constitutional structure of 
the Fascist regime. He was responding to the manifest crisis of the liberal State, 
generated by the centrifugal pressure exerted by the masses upon the political 
system, which coincided with the extension of the suffrage and the empowerment 
of trade unions.44 Mortati thus “discovers” the existence of a fourth constitutional 
function beyond the traditional three of the liberal model because he is looking for 
(a) an element of closure of the constitutional order which could not be found in 
liberal theories of the separation of powers and (b) a steering power which cannot 
                                                     
41 For an introduction, in English, see I. Jennings, ‘Institutional Theory’, in Modern Theories of 
Law (Oxford University Press, 1933) 68-85. For a recent analysis of the tradition of 
institutionalism see M. Loughlin, Political Juriusprudence (Oxford University Press, 2017) 
chapters 6 & 7; cf M. La Torre, Law as Institution (Springer, 2008). 
42  Mortati has often been portrayed by Italian scholarship as a follower of Schmitt’s 
constitutional thought. However, despite his admiration for the German constitutional 
lawyer, he made clear in several occasions his frustration for the deficit of concreteness and 
realism in Schmitt’s work. For a comparison between the two authors see A. Catania, 
‘Mortati e Schmitt’, in A. Catelani S. Labriola (eds), La costituzione materiale. Percorsi culturali e 
attualità di un’idea (Giuffré, 2001) 109-128. See, also, the remarks about Mortati’s rejection of 
Schmitt’s existentialist account of the identity of the people in Loughlin, Foundations of Public 
Law, above 397. 
43 See respectively, C. Mortati, L’ordinamento del governo (Giuffré, 2000, or. ed. 1931); La volontà e 
la causa nell’atto amministrativo e nella legge (De Luca, 1935); La costituzione in senso materiale 
(Giuffré, 1998, or. ed. 1940). Available commentaries of Mortati’s work in English are M. La 
Torre, ‘The German Impact on Fascist Public Law: Costantino Mortati’s Material 
Constitution’ and G. Della Cananea, ‘Mortati and the Science of Public Law’, both in C. 
Joerges, N. Ghaleigh (eds), Darker Legacies of Law in Europe (Hart Publishing, 2003) 305-20 
and 321-336. 
44 Santi Romano already diagnosed the crisis of the liberal form of the State in 1910, with a 
remarkable essay which served as the background to Mortati’s early research: see Lo Stato 
moderno e la sua crisi (Pisa University Press, 2013, or. ed. 1910). 
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be reduced to the executive, capable of cementing the political unity of the State. 
The governing function is described as essential, autonomous, supreme and 
distinct.45  It is the Ur-Funktion of the State legal order and, crucially, the one 
capable of moulding societal development. 
 In order to grasp the critical importance of governing, Mortati presents 
society as something that has to be organised, rather than a given. The governing 
function is the political drive behind this organisation of society. Society itself is 
grounded in two distinct but intertwined principles, differentiation and 
specification. Differentiation, which is immanent to all modern constitutions,46 is 
viewed by Mortati in terms of the basic distinction between those who rule and 
those who are ruled. 47  This distinction highlights the central role played by 
authoritative command, but is also applied to societal organisation itself. 48 
Differentiation is essential for Mortati because the legal order takes shape only by 
making the organisation of society concrete, by defining specific roles and 
positions. Specification individuates the social and political groups that occupy 
those roles and positions. The artificial character of this process is realised only 
when certain groups become dominant, exercise the governing function in a way 
that leaves an imprint upon society. It occurs predominantly within the political 
system, and more precisely through organised (and mass-based) political parties. 
Mortati shares Heller’s judgment about the importance of representative politics in 
the process of societal construction. Political unity cannot be achieved through 
abstractions or general laws.49 Society is ‘the product of a differentiated integration 
of intersubjective relations’,50 which can only be mediated by political parties.  
The mediation of political subjects thus operates as an ordering factor of 
the material constitution, as the political forces construct unity out of 
differentiation and specification. What Mortati has in mind is a political party 
which is able to translate the life of the State into concrete State action, to the 
exclusion of conflicting conceptions. 51  This is strictly necessary to the 
                                                     
45 Mortati, L’ordinamento del governo, above 14-15. 
46Mortati, La costituzione in senso materiale, above 56-61.  
47 Mortati explicitly rejected the dyad friend/enemy as foundational: see C. Mortati, ‘Brevi note 
su costituzione e politica nel pensiero di Carl Schmitt’ (1973) 2 Quaderni Fiorentini per la storia 
del pensiero giuridico 511, 518, where Mortati quotes J. Freund, L’essence du politique (Dalloz, 
1965) 100 as an example of the primacy of the couple command/obedience (which he calls 
the dyad of political unity) over the couple friend/enemy (which Mortati defines as the 
couple of disintegration). 
48  Mortati believed that if the governing function were to be autonomous, distinct and 
supreme, it had to be entrusted to a specific supreme organ whose directives would be easily 
identifiable. In the same years, an alternative and insightful reflection on the governing 
function proposed to see it as spread across all three classic constitutional functions: see V. 
Crisafulli, Prima e dopo la costituzione (Editoriale Scientifica, 2015, or. ed. 1939). 
49 Mortati, La costituzione in senso materiale, above 138: ‘the people taken in its generality, even if it 
develops a series of legal convictions concerning particular relationships, cannot supply the 
general principle of unification which serves to bring clashing interests to compromise and set 
the State moving towards a definite goal’. 
50 Mortati, ‘Brevi note su costituzione e politica nel pensiero di Carl Schmitt’, above 514. 
51 Mortati, La costituzione in senso materiale, above 71. 
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consolidation of the political unity of the State.52 In fact, only through the political 
mediation of parties53 can differentiation and specification be achieved in a way 
that is productive rather than destructive of unity. But in order to perform this 
function, political parties have to advance general political aims.54 
One final point should therefore be emphasised. Mortati believes that 
differentiation and specification as ordering processes cannot but be organised 
with a view to realise a concrete finality. This is the identifying moment of each 
and every form of State: it ‘arises on the basis of assumptions that are the purpose 
and raison d’être of its founding and interpenetrate with its structure arranged so 
as to implement that foundation. It derives this purpose from sociological 
factors’.55  
Differentiation and specification of the political forces that represent the 
ruling block and determine the political finality of the legal order are a critical 
element in explaining the material constitution. But, despite the central role of 
political forces, Mortati insists on the juristic nature of the processes behind the 
formation of the material constitution. This is a key point because it permits 
Mortati to avoid constitutional dualism, that is, a strict separation of facts and 
norms.  
To be able to take up the role of bearer of the material constitution 
requires social or political groups to be already organised, which means that they 
already have principles of organisation and concrete objectives. The material 
constitution can be described as an object of juristic knowledge because these 
principles and objectives are introjected into law. This point cannot be 
underestimated: political objectives are juridically relevant because they are 
harnessed by a governing function and, at the same time, are primary sources of 
the legal order.56  In this way, Mortati describes the emergence of the material 
constitution as the condensation of a number of political groups around some 
fundamental political objectives with a view to their realisation with the support of 
legal institutions.57 This process is neither fully decisionist, because the selection of 
fundamental political objectives takes place in an environment already 
                                                     
52 It should be noted that this applies to the famous monograph published during the fascist 
regime and to the analysis of the republican political system as well. However, there is an 
important difference between Mortati’s interpretation of the role of the single party during the 
fascist epoch and the fascist public lawyers: according to the latter, the party was an 
autonomous and sovereign institution, while according to Mortati the party is fundamentally an 
organ of the State. Cf. also, the difference with Schmitt’s Movement, Party, State (Plutarch Press, 
2001, or. ed. 1934).  
53 In his late works, Mortati seems to concede that political parties might not be the only 
bearers of the material constitution. Mortati made reference to the ‘governing class’ (as 
opposed to the political class), but never developed this point further: C. Mortati, 
‘Costituzione’, in Una e indivisibile (Giuffré, 2008, or. ed. 1962) 162-163. 
54 General here means that these aims concern the whole society (or at least, a vast majority of 
its social relations). 
55 Mortati, La volontà e la causa nell’atto amministrativo e nella legge, above 150. 
56 Mortati, Costituzione in senso materiale, above. 110. 
57 Cf C. Mortati, La costituente, in Raccolta di Scritti, vol. 1 (Giuffré, 1972, or. ed. 1946) 297. 
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characterised by ordering factors (the political groups, in order to be effective, 
must have ordering principles) nor fully normativist, because the norms of the 
material constitution are marked as ‘political law’ (diritto politico), their content 
determined by the introjection of the political objectives into the norms 
themselves.58  Therefore the juridical core of the material constitution is identified 
not in decisions or norms (as if they were two separate epistemic realms), but in 
normative facts. A normative fact is ‘a fact which has in itself its own law and the 
guarantees of its persistence in the future’.59 
If this resembles the notion of hegemony, it should not be confused with 
the arbitrary or irrational exercise of power. Mortati is a constitutional realist, but 
not a legal realist: in his view, law cannot be reduced to a mere instrument in the 
hands of those who obtain political hegemony.60  The reason is the following: 
given that the material constitution is the result of processes of differentiation and 
specification which rely on complicated compromises on political objectives, not 
every use or manipulation of positive law is available. This is so for two reasons: 
first, the equilibrium obtained by differentiation and specification is based on a 
settled arrangement which is usually the end result of compromises among the 
bearers of the material constitution; second, it is often the case that the hegemonic 
bloc introduces formal institutions as a guarantee of the material core of the 
constitution.61 Therefore, according to Mortati, the material constitution is never 
reducible to the registration of an elite’s factual supremacy, but remains part of an 
order which also includes (and needs) the formal constitution.  
 
3. RENEWING THE MATERIAL CONSTITUTION 
 
To speak of the material constitution is not merely to insist, with a legal 
positivist such as Hans Kelsen, that the effectiveness of law, whilst not the same 
as its validity, is a condition of validity.62  That of course, is a truism. De jure 
authority depends on (and is conditioned by) de facto authority, as positivists as 
much as natural lawyers concede. But both positivist and naturalist traditions 
retain a methodology of separation of fact and norm that is inimical to 
                                                     
58 Mortati, Costituzione in senso materiale, above 106. 
59  Mortati, La costituente, above 12. This is one of the doctrines where Mortati’s legal 
institutionalism appears more evident. 
60 Mortati’s material constitution has been compared to Gramsci’s idea of hegemony. See, for 
example, G. Volpe, Il costituzionalismo del Novecento (Laterza, 2000) 122-127. While one can 
identify certain similarities (the role of the political party as the new prince being the most 
obvious one), it is on the instrumental use of law that Gramsci and Mortati come apart. 
Mortati would not concede that the law could ever be understood as a superstructure. 
61 One example of post-WWII constitutionalism can illustrate this second point: constitutional 
courts can be seen as institutional guardians not only of the formal, but of the principles of 
the material constitution as well. One can see this logic at play in the case law concerning the 
doctrine of the so-called ‘counter-limits’. For a reconstruction of this doctrine in the German 
context see J. Murkens, From Empire to Union (Oxford University Press, 2013) 203-206. 
62 See H. Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory, translated by B.L. Paulson & S.L. 
Paulson (Clarendon Press, 1992). 
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understanding the constitution in practice, to tracking constitutional development 
in the interrelation of fact and norm. What, to adapt Kelsen’s own terminology, 
are the conditions of effectiveness and how does law stand in relation to them? To 
this question, the positivist offers no answers. The positivist (as well as the 
naturalist) merely assumes effectiveness, or presupposes the existence of a 
‘standing constitutional tradition’. In an era where such traditions are looking 
increasingly precarious, and the effectiveness of law itself is in doubt, the question 
must be posed anew. 
Kelsen’s normativism and Schmitt’s decisionism are dualistic theories that 
tend to self-negation by posing the initial point of view as absolute, either in the 
form of a logical norm (a ‘transcendental presupposition’) or an existential order. 
Heller and Mortati avoid this, and instead offer dynamic accounts, developing the 
interrelation of fact and norm, based in Heller’s case on the democratic 
management of social homogeneity and in Mortati’s case on the emergence of 
hegemonic forces capable of pursuing fundamental political aims.  
Mortati lived long enough (until 1985) to see the first signs of crisis of the 
new material constitutional order and new type of State that had emerged in the 
postwar period. By the end of his academic career, he had come to recognise the 
limits of political parties in stabilising constitutional order. Their constituent 
moment was exhausted, incapable of overcoming the particularistic interests they 
represented. In the absence of proper mediation by political subjects, the principle 
of differentiation could no longer be effectively channelled. As a result Mortati 
began to make reference instead to the ‘governing class’.63 But this is not a minor 
or insignificant change of vocabulary. Whereas political parties were deemed to be 
constitutional organs, vague concepts like the governing class could not be 
identified as such. The upshot is that the only point of convergence on 
constitutional principles is provided by procedures upon which all interested 
parties can agree. Political activity is then reduced to a form of negotiation or 
deliberation. A procedural solution would bring us back to Kelsen (and in 
contemporary democratic theory, forward to Habermas’s discourse theory). 64 
What is at stake, thus, is the primacy of the material constitution itself, that is, the 
primacy of the dynamic ordering of the constitution. 
In the classical liberal constitutional State, form and function coincided. 
There was an intrinsic finality, the protection of individual freedom, and the 
techniques to guarantee it (protection of personal rights and the separation of 
powers). The form of the constitution contained its function as well. The 
transformation of the State in the 20th century gave rise to a different typology. 
Each constitutional State develops its own set of fundamental aims, whether the 
Germany of the Weimar Republic, Spain’s Franco regime or the constitutional 
order of the USSR. But these aims do not necessarily correspond to the State’s 
                                                     
63 Mortati, ‘Costituzione’, above 162. 
64  See J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy (MIT Press, 1996).  
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constitutional structure. They will sometimes collide. The efficacy of form may be 
severed from the efficacy of function.  
Constitutional ordering occurs both at the constituent moment of 
bootstrapping a new form of State into existence, and in the daily governing 
function required to maintain its authority. In conditions of growing complexity, 
the modern State will no longer be deemed merely a guardian or a neutral actor 
standing behind and apart from civil society. It is indeed unsurprising that theories 
of the material constitution were conceived during the interwar breakdown of 
liberal constitutionalism, the emergence of political authoritarianism, and the 
consolidation of the fascist corporatist State and then of the new Welfare State 
that emerged after World War II. In these circumstances the material order of the 
state was more visibly seen.  
Despite their significant contributions, Heller’s and Mortati’s efforts, 
however, remain insufficiently materialist. While the statist and institutionalist 
bases of their constitutional doctrines are resonant because they attempt to 
integrate societal formation, institutional power, and constitutional order, there is a 
formalist remainder. According to Mortati, the material core is in the end specified 
by the hegemony of the ruling political block and its fundamental political aims. 
According to Heller, it is ultimately determined by the individual conscience as an 
ethical question of the common good. The core of the material constitution, its 
teleological unity, is left to the vagaries of sheer political circumstance or, at best, 
the interiority of ethical conscience.  In both cases, social relations must be  
converted into political considerations in order to be integrated as constitutional. 
They are not properly addressed as materially productive of constitutional order in 
their own right.  
It is the task now therefore to provide a fuller theory of the material 
constitution, specifically an account of the substantial content of its ordering 
forces. 65 
 
4. THE FOUR ORDERING FORCES OF THE MATERIAL 
CONSTITUTION 
The conditions of constitutional formation and durability include political 
economy, political culture, social relations, religion, as well as geopolitical factors, 
international relations and imperial forms of domination. It is not just that the 
development of modern constitutions is shaped by these factors from the outside, 
as it were, as mere irritants to an already established order. It is that they combine 
to constitute order itself and to condition constitutional development through 
processes of re-ordering (and of disordering). 
These factors can be integrated into constitutional enquiry by placing their 
relation with the constitution at the centre of analysis. Taking this approach 
                                                     
65 Traces of this material analysis are scattered in Mortati’s reading of the labourist principle 
lying at the core of the Italian republican constitution (art. 1): C. Mortati, Il lavoro nella 
costituzione (Giuffré, 2005, or. ed 1950). 
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means, for constitutional scholars, to take as matters of juristic knowledge, geo-
political, political, and social concepts which had been previously been delegated – 
or relegated - to other disciplines, such as sociology, international relations, and 
political theory.  Material conditions and relations are thus both constituted (by 
law and politics) and constitutive (of law and politics). The dynamic interactions 
among these elements are intrinsic to constitutional ordering. 
Since there is always an internal relation between constitutional order and 
society, the constitution is conceived as a feature of political and social power. But 
power here is neither an insurgent mass nor a mere abstract relation. The 
formation, subsistence and reproduction of society always already entails 
constitutional ordering. In that sense constitutional power is always already 
constituted as well as constituting power, as Hans Lindahl has carefully 
theoretically reconstructed.66 But how is it ordered? And why might order turn to 
disorder? In the next section we consider how to organise and conceptualise the 
process of constitutional ordering by offering four inter-linked building blocks of 
analysis: four ordering forces of the material constitution.  
 
a) POLITICAL UNITY 
The first force of constitutional ordering is the production and reproduction of 
political unity. A political unity gives sense to a constitution, trivially to enable us to 
speak, as we do, of the German Constitution, the United States Constitution or 
the Egyptian Constitution. The constitution exists as a political unity, not as an 
abstract set of norms. Even here, however, we should notice immediately that 
ambiguities are raised in relation to the historical context. Are we speaking of the 
Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany? Before or after reunification? 
Before or after the OMT decision of the Bundesverfassungsgerricht? We might of 
course be offering a snapshot, speaking of a momentary constitutional order, but 
this will not be very revealing as a matter of constitutional theory. The 
constitutional order is always a process of becoming.  
In a standard narrative, the rupture on which political unity is built is 
immaterial: it is the autonomy – and primacy - of the political from the theological 
domain that opens the space for modern constitutional ordering.67 This transition 
is captured by Marcel Gauchet’s ‘secularization thesis’, which characterises 
modernity as a process of religious disenchantment, signalled by the secularization 
of the grounds of political authority.68 ‘We, the people’ are now the grounds of 
legitimate authority. This symbolic transformation plays the lead role in 
commencing and advancing the process of modern constitutional ordering. 
                                                     
66  See H. Lindahl, ‘Constituent Power and Reflexive Identity: Towards an Ontology of 
Collective Selfhood’, in M. Loughlin, N. Walker (eds), The Paradox of Constitutionalism (Oxford 
University Press, 2007) 9-24. 
67 See M. Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2010). 
68 M. Gauchet, The Disenchantment of the World: A Political History of Religion (Diane Publishing, 
2001).  
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But what are the material conditions of this rupture and the political unity it 
inaugurates? The formation of political unity requires a material process of 
political integration (or disintegration and re-integration as the case may be) of a 
collectivity. A constitutional order, in other words, represents a certain conception 
of political space (which, in the political form of the modern State, is conceived as 
territory)69 and often has a clearly marked origin in time.  
Political unity takes specific forms in particular historical epochs and 
geographical spaces. It is part of constitutional analysis to track this, to consider 
what conditions its development and what are the constitutional implications of a 
particular form. Whether the political unity is obtained through a nation-state, a 
federal state, a multinational federation, an inter-state confederation, a 
supranational union or imperial domination, reflects a particular path of 
institutional and societal development and therefore a particular path of 
constitutional ordering. Conversely, the formal constitution and its interpretation 
by official bodies can have a significant and even decisive impact on the particular 
path taken towards political unity.  
Yet despite the variations and the distinct types of political unity that emerge 
in this process of constitutional ordering, the modern European nation-state 
remains paradigmatic (at least in Europe). Its internal relation to the material 
constitution therefore deserves particular attention.  
The ideal-type of a nation-state is consolidated as a political unity through the 
establishment of a bounded community of belonging. In an influential account, it 
is constructed as a shared community of fate based on the imagined belonging to a 
nation.70 Attachment to a constitution can itself play a significant symbolic role in 
this process of collective identity formation, captured in the idea of ‘constitutional 
patriotism’.71 Collective identity is thus understood as politically constructed. But 
shared identity can also be presented as a presupposition of constitutionalism, and 
hence as a vector of or even an obstacle to constitutional re-ordering.72  
The modern nation-state is consolidated as a constitutional order by 
becoming a politically sovereign entity, in a two-fold manner, captured by what 
Carl Schmitt termed the Jus Publicum Europeaum.73 Internally, the European nation-
state acquires the monopoly of legitimate force over the course of the ‘long 19th 
century’ (from the French Revolution to the First World War). Externally, it is 
recognised as the only legitimate subject of international relations, with the right to 
decide on matters of war and peace, subject to conventions regarding civilized 
warfare.  
                                                     
69 For example, cf H. Lefevbre, The Production of Space (Blackwell, 1991); on the material limits 
of Lefevbre’s reconstruction see N. Brenner, S. Elden, ‘Henri Lefevbre on State, Space, 
Territory’ 4 (2009) International Political Sociology 353-377. 
70 See B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (Verso, 
1983). 
71 See e.g. J-W. Muller, ‘A General Theory of Constitutional Patriotism’ (2008) 6 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 72 – 95.  
72 See e.g. D. Grimm, ‘Does Europe Need a Constitution?’ (1995) European Law Journal 282. 
73 See C. Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth (Telos Press, 2006).  
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But neither bounded community nor political sovereignty accounts for the 
material dynamic of constitutional ordering. To pursue this further, we can begin 
with Schmitt’s retrieval of the term ‘nomos’ from the original Greek meaning, as a 
territorial unity of law and space. The meaning of classical state sovereignty in the 
Euro-centric tradition is, according to Schmitt, a concrete order based on land 
appropriation and claim to radical title overseas. This material grounding of 
political unity on an initial appropriation of land brings it into contact with an 
established as well as critical tradition in political economy, which presents it as 
setting in train and conditioning capitalist economic development: Adam Smith’s 
‘previous accumulation’, Marx’s ‘original’ or ‘primitive accumulation’, Max 
Weber’s ‘political capitalism’. Hannah Arendt, following Rosa Luxemburg, 
describing the imperialism of the late 19th century, calls it ‘simple robbery’.74  
But political unity then looks to stand on much less firm ground than 
Schmitt’s nomos. It emerges on the shifting sands of material development, in 
relation to production and distribution (and not only taking) of land as well to the 
material organisation of (unequal) social relations based on labour and money. 
Luxemburg had directly recalled the added significance of nomos as nahme in 
relation to modern imperialism, picked up in her analysis of imperial Landnahme 
not only as an act of ‘land-grabbing’, but also as a process of capitalist market 
expansion. 75  The focus merely on an initial land grab occludes the material 
development of this early modern nomos. As David Harvey more recently notes, 
the modern state is not only founded on an initial ‘grab’ but its class character 
(relations of domination) is maintained through reiterated processes of 
‘accumulation by dispossession’. This occurs not only through force and fraud, but 
also through formal measures of privatisation and austerity, managing the relation 
between private and public debt.76  
The formation of political unity thus occurs in relation not (only) to the 
symbolic moment of religious disenchantment, nor (only) to a bounded 
community based on the concrete act of territorial appropriation, but to the 
political and economic organization and re-organisation of social relations across 
time and space.  
From this viewpoint, the process of constitutional ordering is internally 
related to the transformation of the state from a feudal to a capitalist and later 
imperial organization of power. It is dependent upon and in tension with unequal 
relations – relations of domination - between, for example, capital and labour, or 
core and periphery. Constitutional ordering then looks like a fraught, contingent 
and uneven historical dynamic based on material factors that are reproduced 
                                                     
74 See H. Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism (Harcourt, 1968), 148. 
75 Schmitt omits discussion of Luxemburg’s updating of Marxism for the imperial age; he does 
however, briefly address Marx’s idea of original appropriation in Nomos of the Earth, 333- 334, 
adding that, ‘if the essence of imperialism lies in the precedence of appropriation before 
distribution and production, then a doctrine such as expropriation of the expropriators is 
obviously the strongest imperialism, because it is the most modern’ 334.  
76 D. Harvey, The New Imperialism (Oxford University Press, 2003); M. Blyth, Austerity: The 
History of a Dangerous Idea (Oxford University Press, 2013).  
 18 
politically, not only since the state has to provide for security and welfare but 
because the claims to popular sovereignty, national community and imperial 
domination (as well as class-based and anti-imperialist counter-claims to 
emancipation or self-determination) are themselves features of material demands 
for expansion or inclusion of the demos.  
The territorial and communitarian logic of political unity and the capitalist 
logic of domestic and imperialist market expansion exist in a tense relationship. 77  
Political unity itself is threatened by the perception that constitutional ordering 
occurs on the basis of brute economic domination, whether of a dominant 
domestic ruling class, a dominant state within a federation, or an imperial power. 
In order for constitutional ordering to produce a relatively stable political unity, 
such as a nation-state or a supranational union, and not merely an order of 
economic domination, such as the executive committee of the bourgeoisie or a 
hegemonic bloc of creditor states, the notional separation of political and 
economic power is required.  
The internal relationship between the formation of political unity and 
political economy is thus significant in that the modern nation-state is typically 
conceptualised in constitutional theory as a political form in which authority does 
not rest on the explicit fusion of political and economic power: it is the relative 
autonomy of the political from the economic that sustains modern constitutional 
authority, distinguishing it from prior political forms, medieval as well as ancient.78 
But if the modern state represents not only an appropriation of land, but – as 
dynamic material ordering - a transformation of social and geopolitical relations 
through the commodification of land, labour and money based on the logic of capital 
accumulation, there will be a continual tension between political unity and material 
inequality.79 
The formation of modern statehood is internally related to a dynamic of 
formal equality (the appeal to political unity) and material inequality (resulting 
from a relatively autonomous economic sphere). The modern state requires a 
relatively autonomous mode of political authority as well as the means of ensuring 
the flow of capital accumulation through the structures of the bourgeois Rechtsstaat, 
and other forms (and informal modes) of geo-political domination and market 
expansion.80 Political unity requires and builds a bounded community and political 
sovereignty, but is both made possible and threatened by the material relations of 
inequality and domination that pervade civil society. The project of attaining and 
                                                     
77 See e.g. W. Streeck, ‘Taking Capitalism Seriously: Towards an Institutional Approach to 
Contemporary Political Economy’ (2011) Socio-Economic Review 137 – 167.  
78 Cf. E. Wood, From Lords to Citizens: A Social History of Western Political Thought (Verso, 2011). 
79 See R. Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital: A Contribution to an Economic Explanation of 
Imperialism (Routledge, 2003 (1913)). These are the three ‘fictitious commodities’; 
commodification of which Polanyi thought leads to a double-movement of social reaction or 
re-embedding, potentially destabilising the constitutional order. See, K. Polanyi, The Great 
Transformation (Beacon Press, 1944) ch. 6. 
80 See K. Polanyi The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, above 
chapters 4 & 5. 
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maintaining political unity is thus unstable, and this instability is manifested in the 
process of material ordering.  
 
b) INSTITUTIONS 
This outline trace of the dynamic formation of political unity does not capture the 
full substratum of the material order. The formation of political unity, and of a 
constitution itself, depends on the work of institutions, including but not limited to 
formal governmental branches such as courts, parliaments, executives, 
administrations, central banks; it also depends on non-governmental, informal, 
societal and cultural institutions, such as family, language, property, trade unions, 
myths and symbols. These have a unifying role and exercise an ordering force but 
evidently enjoy some autonomy from the logic of political unity. 81  
Institutions are the ‘objects’ which comprise the material constitution (in 
Aristotelian terms, its material cause). They are produced through social 
interactions and develop their own institutional normativity, in the manner of 
customs or conventions. Their existence is crucial for the formation of the 
constitutional order, but they may lead to fragmentation and instability. Hence, 
institutions perform an ordering function only when they can be combined in a 
way that is compatible with the concrete form of political unity. The combination 
of institutions in support of the constitutional order is part of the art of governing. 
Construction of the social order is an artificial and selective political activity. 
There is no natural connection between a given political community and the 
institutions that the legal order of that community protects and advances. It is 
partially the role of political activity to carry out a selective job and identify 
institutions that are conducive to a relatively stable order.82 Such selection is to 
some extent context-specific and, of course, never neutral.83 It may require the 
support of processes of socialisation and daily learning practices. The awareness of 
this stratifcationof the material order of society emerges clearly in Heller’s work, 
where, describing one of the five meanings of the constitution (the material 
constitution in the wide sense), he notes that fundamental ethical principles are 
made intelligible to both the governing and the governed not by a basic norm, but, 
                                                     
81 On the idea that institutions have their own internal principles because they are ‘social 
organizations’, see the seminal work by S. Romano, The Legal Order (Routledge, 2017) 19. 
82  Later in his career, Schmitt will emphasise this aspect of concrete order thinking, in 
particular in his On the Three Types of Juristic Thought (Praeger, 2004). For a reconstruction of 
this phase of Schmitt’s thought, see M. Croce and A. Salvatore, The Legal Theory of Carl 
Schmitt (Routledge, 2013) 30-45. 
83 Note that Mortati envisaged a way to strengthen the link between political institutions and 
society by hinting that judges and administrative agencies should not operate in a fully neutral 
way because ‘the activities of the organs themselves […] must be arranged in such a way as to 
fit the ends to which they are directed: which requires of those persons who have to carry out 
the activity itself not the capacity to be impersonal interpreters, but conformity with a type that 
is harmonious with a given ideology’: Volontà e causa nell’atto amministrativo, above 126 (italics 
added). Later, Mortati maintained the idea that institutions are not acting in a neutral sphere, 
but dropped the reference to the ‘type’ of person. 
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among other things, ‘by tradition, political expediency, situations of power and the 
legal culture’.84 To perform this consolidating function, there must be political and 
legal institutions which protect and foster social institutions and their substantive 
identity.  
These processes should not be viewed as isolated events. Constitutional 
ordering, as noted above, is a dynamic process of becoming and this means, from 
a material perspective, the possibility of adaptation (within certain limits) to 
challenges and internal conflicts. 85  Because of the potential integration of 
previously excluded figures, conflicts can nurture the material constitution by 
strengthening the institutions involved in their management or deferral. 
Institutions, including formal constitutional ones, rarely resolve conflicts in a final 
way, but they might prevent them from degenerating into outright hostility or 
political and societal collapse, acting as pressure valves for conflictual energies to 
be spent. And because there is always room for new interpretations of an 
institution’s normativity, and for new institutions to emerge, the material 
constitution must remain flexible and dynamic if it is to negotatiate the challenges 
of integration.  
Institutions are fragile achievements. They come under pressure both from 
above, when for example, they come into conflict with forces of political 
unification or material economic expansion, and from below, when social relations 
emerge in a manner which threatens their continuing stability. Trust in institutions 
might then be eroded, even fatally, and the need arise for their reconstruction.  
The story of constitutional law in Europe in the second half of the twentieth 
century is, for example, one of extraordinary institution re-building on the basis of 
new forms of political accountability, frequently non-majoritarian or 
technocratic.86 From the pre-eminence of constitutional courts to the more recent 
rise of independent central banks, this reflects a distinct set of beliefs about the 
institutional mediation of the governing relationship, beliefs which were in part 
formed out of reaction to the breakdown of liberal democratic institutions in the 
interwar period. 87  This process of institution-building continues at the 
supranational and international level, through the project of European integration 
and the European Convention on Human Rights. As institutions acquire a certain 
life of their own, however, most notably in the case of the EU, their social dis-
embeddedness poses distinct problems of constitutional legitimacy. With the 
proliferation of institutions come added layers of complexity as well as increasing 
points of conflict, at the interface between domestic and supranational institutions 
(most evidently between judicial authorities at national and European level) but 
                                                     
84 H. Heller, ‘Nature and Function of the State’ (1996) 8 Cardozo Law Review 1213. 
85 For further reflection on this key point, see section 5, below. 
86 See e.g. J.-W. Müller, Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth Century Europe (Princeton 
University Press, 2011)  
87  See e.g. M. Wilkinson, ‘The Reconstitution of Postwar Europe: Liberal Excesses, 
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also between clashing logics of rationality, such as between legality and market 
rationality, competition and solidarity, and between opposing political and social 
forces.88  
Since institutions might mediate conflicts between state and society but do 
not finally resolve them, we need to turn to a further ordering force, that of the 
‘horizontal’ social relations that pertain between the individuals and groups who 
constitute a political unity and who comprise the instituting power of the 
society.Institutions are based on a relatively autonomous instituting power, which 
erupts out of society and the social imaginary.89 The instituting power reflects not 
only social conflict but also forms of co-operation and solidarity. These twin 
drivers of social reproduction must be kept in view. In order to take the analysis a 
step further we will now examine the basic social relations and material conflicts 
which constitute and condition the process of constitutional development. 
 
c) SOCIAL RELATIONS   
The most basic material out of which a constitution is formed lies below the layer 
of institutions. It consists in subjective social interaction as well as social conflict. 
This is constituted and conditioned (sometimes tempered, as well as occasionally 
inflamed) by movements of solidarity as well as by competition. Social conflict and 
interaction is softened, concealed, maybe even displaced by the unifying function 
of institutions and the political unity of the state itself, but not (perhaps never), 
fully or finally resolved. 
The extent to which social relations (and in turn the institutions and political 
unity they constitute) are conditioned by specific forms of class consciousness and 
class domination - where class need not be determined by ownership of the means 
of production as understood in orthodox Marxism - remains a live question. But it 
is an important advantage of our approach, over a purely political jurisprudence 
(or a formal constitutionalism), that the relationship and the distance (or 
disconnect) between rulers and ruled and between the ruled themselves is not 
represented as purely formal or hierarchical. In a society which considers itself 
democratic, or in some sense as self-governing, the idea of a gap between rulers 
and ruled is itself antithetical to constitutional ordering, at least to its self-image as 
a democratic society. This is not to say there can be a pure identity between rulers 
and ruled. It is to say that the relation between rulers and ruled is a material and 
dynamic one that takes a certain trajectory in a democratic and capitalist society, 
because of the aspiration to the inter-changeability of rulers and ruled based on 
some notion of political equality on the one hand, and the market economy as a 
driver of social inequality and domination on the other.90  
Constitutional actors (subjects) must not therefore be reduced to the status 
of already constituted or abstract objects (or institutions). Instead, constitutional 
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study must focus equally on the processes of ‘subjectivation’, the formation of 
collective political actors and their contribution to constitutional change. This is 
also a question of identification: does the individual conceive of himself or herself, 
for example, predominantly as a part of a particular class, nation, or ethnicity, as a 
citizen, entrepreneur or a consumer? Or in what combination? 
Constitutional lawyers can return to old insights from sociologically-sensitive 
studies of the constitution in order to integrate processes of subjectivation into the 
analysis. The substantive production and reproduction of material order is the 
outcome of a series of social, political and geopolitical conflicts through which 
collective subjectivities are forged. Collective subjects provide the impetus for the 
material dynamic of political formation and institutional development. We need, 
then, to shift the constitutional focus from the abstract individual (or institution) 
back to these processes of subjectivation, as well as their potential for inclusion 
and exclusion.  
To restate a well-known insight of Machiavelli, if the emergence of a new 
material constitution is possible only through the political action of the prince, or 
equivalent (in Gramsci’s version, the political party),91 this depends on processes 
of selective subjectivation and must be sustained by a series of organised political 
subjects. Contrary to Heller and Mortati, political here should be read lato sensu and 
not in any way limited to political parties or otherwise already institutionalised 
forms. It should include informal groups and social movements, including anti-
systemic and disordering social forces (e.g. worker’s movements, women’s 
movements, anti-colonial movements).  
Although study of political economy is essential for understanding the 
material formation and reproduction of society (its metaphorical ‘backbone’), the 
structure and content of the material constitution is not economically determined. 
Its emergence is clearly intertwined with the concrete organisation of the political 
economy, but the study of the material constitution cannot be reduced to the study 
of the underlying economic base.92 Or, to put it differently, the economic base 
must not be presented as over-determining the material constitution; rather they 
are inter-related. Political economy stands upon existing forms of order and its 
trajectory is advanced by a (constrained) series of political actions, including those 
represented through the formation of political unity. Political subjects are thus 
essential in the formation and then preservation of a particular political economy, 
as well as in fomenting change through putting pressure on reforming the 
political-economic structure through movements of solidarity or competition.  
If social relations become too materially heterogeneous, through the rise in 
socio-economic inequality, constitutional ordering itself may become difficult 
particularly if representative of a gulf between rulers and ruled. As the underlying 
social relations become fraught, instability or even revolt beckons. Heller so 
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presciently suggested this in late Weimar as a matter of constitutional disordering, 
and it is a theme that has returned to prominence since the financial crisis.93 
This reveals a point of divergence from the dominant sociological approach 
to constitutionalism, which endorses or implies a communicative rationality or even 
rational consensus. In these systemic approaches, only communicative exchanges 
in accordance with the relevant code are registered.94 The internal relation between 
constitution and society is conceived in utterly irenic terms, except for the 
exceptional cases when a system is going to ‘hit the bottom’. 95  But neither 
ordering, nor, significantly, disordering constitutional forces can be accounted for 
in such terms. It leaves insufficient constitutional room for political subjectivation, 
societal conflicts, social movements and anti-systemic forces (whose aim is to 
change the constitution is an irregular manner or in terms that would affect its 
substantive identity). Conflict is endemic to the process of constitutional ordering, 
not peripheral.  
The political, subjective and conflictual dimension of the material 
constitution suggests an affinity with the Marxist tradition. This has recently been 
revitalised in constitutional theory in the work of Antonio Negri, and the view 
proposed here shares something with it.96 Negri’s materialist understanding of the 
constitution permits a focus on movement rather than merely origins and is able 
to explain material constitutional development. For Negri, the material 
constitution refers to ‘the continuous formation and re-formation of the 
composition of social forces’. 97  This movement is determined through class 
struggles, which are consubstantial with processes of collective subjectivation – 
the construction and formation of collective subjects. The material constitution 
thus evolves within spatially delimited coordinates (the factory, then society itself) 
as collective subjects are formed. This aspect of collective agency avoids the 
reduction of the material constitution to what might be called ‘structure without 
subjects’, or ‘natural-social’ relations of production (which include exchange, law, 
culture, ideological practices).98 The view of the constitution as the imposition 
upon society of an order by an already formed elite is rightly rejected.99  
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Yet Negri grants insufficient space to political activity intended as something 
relatively autonomous from societal struggle and, in later versions of his theory, 
ends up undermining the productive role of class conflict itself. It is no 
coincidence that his collective subject becomes the multitude (counterpart to an 
equally nebulous and unitary Empire), and that the only thing missing for the 
reconstitution of the material order is for this multitude to become conscious of 
its status as living labour, that is, as the engine of societal reproduction.  
In our account, on the contrary, the struggles which animate the material 
constitution are conducted by a plurality of subjects whose positions are 
conditioned but not determined by already established relations of production. 
Subjectivity does not stem from social relations of production and re-production 
in a completely direct and spontaneous way. It is mediated through political 
organisation, political institutions and political strategies. Economic and social 
forces must not be presented as over-determining the material constitution 
precisely because their role in shaping the constitutional order has to be 
understood in relational terms and not just as a top-down exercise of ruling power 
(or a bottom-up mirror image). Economic and social forces do actively order 
certain aspects of the material constitution, but their composition and their 
relation are also constantly subject to tensions and conflicts generated by other 
forces, including political unity, institutions and fundamental political objectives.  
 
d) FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL OBJECTIVES 
There is a final force that conditions the material constitutional order, and may 
even hold it together in spite of social conflict, political disunity and institutional 
weakness. This is captured by a material telos (or set of teloi). Constitutional 
subjects and institutions project certain basic or fundamental political objectives, 
or even a future ‘finality’ of aim, and this of course forecloses or elides others. 
Again, the formal constitution stands in relation to these objectives, sometimes in 
tension with them, sometimes in harmony. 
It is essential to bear in mind that the three previous ordering forces contain 
their own internal ordering logic. However, they have to be understood as part of 
a constellation whose boundaries are ultimately drawn by the objectives of the 
material constitution. Political unity, institutions and development of social 
relations according to specific patterns are not simply achievements in and for 
themselves. Their formation and specification is driven by the teleological 
orientation dictated by fundamental objectives. Of course, this is not a smooth nor 
unidirectional process. The trajectory dictated by one ordering force of the 
material constitution will sometimes conflict with the trajectory of another. The 
constitution will therefore evolve according to the complex interplay of political, 
institutional and social change. It will also evolve in relation to the trajectory laid 
down in the formal constitution and its interpretation by official bodies and 
institutions. At the same time, the formation of political unity, the consolidation of 
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institutions and the development of social relations are constrained by 
fundamental objectives in the sense that these limit their margin of manoeuvre. 
The set of explicit and implicit constitutional aims and objectives reflects the 
composition of dominant social, political and geo-political forces around it. But it 
also acts as a catalyst. This perspective offers an alternative to classic constitutional 
doctrines, which, in accordance with much modern political philosophy, lay 
emphasis on the origin of the constitution, as if it contains within itself the energy 
for the creation and the further development of the constitutional order. This 
origin then appears as external, both to society and to the constitution. As in the 
case of a mechanical device, the original act would set in motion the constitution 
from the outside, acting as an external referent. 
Social contract thinking, which influences a great deal of constitutional theory 
in the liberal and republican traditions, thus poses the creation of society and the 
conditions of constitutional order from an external perspective, that is, from a pre-
political, hypothetical or ‘natural’ condition. The social relations that pertain at the 
time of the so-called origin (whether state of nature or original position) are then 
concealed, nullified by virtue of a thought experiment but one that acts as a 
distorting lens because it de-politicises existing material conditions and social 
relations. Once translated into constitutional law, it also legitimises the 
displacement of matters from the ordinary political and social domains of 
contestation.100  In other words, the material constitution is often entirely (and 
deliberately) concealed from view.  
Decisionism, despite being radically different to social contract in its formal 
outlook, assumes a similar starting point: the origin of the legal order, its ‘big 
bang’, containing the seeds for its further development, lies in a position outside 
of the order itself. The constituent power is conceived as causa incausata, creating a 
new order out of nothing, a quality which can return through the state of 
exception. The origin can then also offer a conservative position, defending the 
constitution reactively against political and social change or against agitation for 
such change.   
Our study of the material constitution takes a different approach. Societal 
formation is always already political; the constitution does not and cannot come 
out of nothing or from a state of nature. What makes societal formation possible 
in the first place, within a determinate space and through the mediation of already 
existing institutions, is the convergence of certain political and social forces upon a 
series of basic political aims and a capacity to affirm them. The state of exception 
then exists within the constitution understood as a material order.  
Through political association, different social forces will tend to commit 
themselves to pursue distinct aims for different reasons and on the basis of 
distinct interests. Through converging upon these aims, hegemonic forces are able 
impress a particular trajectory upon the material constitution. The conditions 
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which make this possible are captured by Poulantzas’s relational conception of 
political power. Poulantzas argued that the material constitution is formed by the 
‘condensation of social forces’ around a set of political aims.101 A version of his 
research question should guide the study of the material constitution: ‘why have 
liberal democracies decided to give themselves these particular political 
constitutions and not others?’ And how do they change over time? These forces 
may be informal as well as formal, they could be predominantly domestic, but they 
could also be formed by a hegemonic bloc within a federation, or geo-political 
domination. 
At the same time, the teleology of the material constitution, by developing 
according to its own (relatively autonomous) logic, moulds the identity of the 
hegemonic forces over time. The trajectory of the material constitution is thus 
conditioned by the objectification of its aims: such an objectification then imposes 
limits on the manner in which to achieve them.102 In other words, the hegemonic 
forces which support the material constitution are not entirely free to change 
course, without limits or constraints. Moreover, the formulation and pursuit of 
fundamental political aims might generate unpredictable consequences, 
contradictions or paradoxes in the unfolding of the material constitution. This is 
to say that in the actual pursuit of common political aims, unforeseen spaces might 
open up for new subjectivities or changes in alliances, and with potentially 
disruptive effects. 
The level of intensity of overall social and institutional support is an 
important indication of the strength of a material constitution. The stronger the 
support for the political aims (or even finality) of a regime, the more solid is its 
material constitution. Without such a trajectory, the material constitution will 
struggle to hold together, particularly when aims directly conflict and the space of 
contestation is closed down.  
It is important to note that there will not necessarily be convergence on these 
aims. Divergence will ensue and existential struggle will also sometimes occur. In 
fact, as suggested above, in the context of political and geo-political capitalist 
dynamics based on competition, class conflict, and imperial domination, as well 
opposing social dynamics based on solidarity, cooperation and emancipation, 
divergence is inevitable. At certain conjunctural moments, where the oppositional 
forces combine to present an existential or constitutional crisis, with no overall 
hegemonic force prevailing, there will be greater fluidity of possibilities, and new 
trajectories will likely emerge, along with new hegemonic forces.  
The notion of a constitutional teleology is an old one. As Aristotle puts it in 
the Politics, the ‘constitution… reveals the aim of the city-state’.103 This may seem 
enigmatic but at a minimum, of course, the implicit aim is the survival of the state, 
polity, or project of political unity. But frequently, and increasingly, formal 
constitutions themselves present more content-specific aims or explicitly 
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announce a telos (or set of teloi). This is the case with many modern constitutions, 
particularly those instituted in Western Europe in the aftermath of the Second 
World War, which promote particular, if still rather underdetermined values, such 
as democracy, federalism, human rights, or social welfare.104 It is also the case with 
the constitutional treaties that are foundational of the European Union.105  
This focus on particular political aims sheds a light on the nature of the art of 
governing, which as noted by Mortati, cannot be reduced to the other three classic 
constitutional functions. But the notion of functions here must not mislead. The 
teleological dimension of the art of governing is shaped by political action rather 
than sheer functionality. This is not a pedantic distinction because it carries with it 
important consequences for understanding the process of constitutional ordering. 
It might be possible for one particular institution in a given constitutional order to 
have the power and the responsibility to steer the governing function toward the 
pursuit of certain fundamental political aims, but this is unlikely. With the growing 
complexity of constitutional structures, it has become increasingly difficult to 
identify the governing function in one single aim or single institution. In fact, since 
the finality of governing a society is not limited to its survival as such but includes 
the realisation or preservation of specific aims, it is more accurate to seek the 
teleology of the material constitution across the institutional spectrum and even 
beyond into the dimension of social relations. In brief, the teleology of the 
constitution is material rather than formal, relating to all the ordering forces of the 
constitution. 
 
5. THE MATERIAL AND THE FORMAL CONSTITUTION 
 
Having outlined the ordering forces of the material constitution, we can 
relate it to the ‘formal’ constitution - the constitutional texts and unwritten 
conventions as interpreted by official bodies. If the formal constitution is the sum 
of all constitutional norms and principles that drive the regulation of political and 
social interactions (constituting the ‘laws of law-making’), this stands in relation to 
the material constitution, but not merely as a relation of form to function or form 
to content. An analysis of the function and content of constitutional norms is of 
course a first and important step in any constitutional enquiry. Constitutions do 
not only establish and regulate a formal process of law-making; they invariably 
protect certain material interests, from freedom of speech to balanced budgets. 
This tells us something about the content of the constitution, at the very least as a 
set of aspirational goals or political and social objectives.  
But the material constitution is not merely the ‘content’ of the formal 
constitution or the totality of formal constitutional norms (even extending this to 
include informal norms and principles); neither does it compete with, substitute 
for or stand in antagonistic relation to the validity of the formal constitution. It 
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does not determine the outcome of political action nor the result of judicial 
adjudication. That might contingently appear to be the case, particularly in 
episodes of political crisis, when positive legal norms are bypassed or the letter of 
the law is overlooked, pushed by clearly identifiable material forces or hedged in 
by material constraints. But critical or conjunctural periods, where material forces 
push in antagonistic directions and open up alternative paths for constitutional 
change, also reveal the relative indeterminacy of the material order.   
Rather, the formal constitution is a feature, an instance, of the material 
constitution,106 part of the wider constitutional order. Without a corresponding 
material constitution, without political and social traction, a formal constitution 
remains a ‘dead letter’, a list of wishful auspices or even a ‘sham’. In that case, 
form and function may depart so far as to call into question the very discourse of 
constitution and of constitutionalism. But, to adopt the language of 19th century 
jurist Ferdinand Lassalle, the distance between the ‘juridical [or formal] 
constitution’ and a ‘real constitution’ (‘the actual relationships of power in a 
country’) must be grasped as a matter of constitutional law and constitutional 
theory.107 And it is important to note that the distance exists in liberal democratic 
as much as non-liberal or non-democratic regimes. All constitutions, it might be 
said, are relatively sham, given the distance between their formal aspirations and 
their lived reality.  
The ‘distance’ between constitutional form and constitutional material is of 
course a matter of degree and admits of little analytical precision. But the 
metaphor of gap or distance is misleading to the extent that it suggests a 
dichotomy whereas the relationship between the ‘formal constitution’ and the 
‘material constitution’ is better characterised as internal. Even an essentially sham 
constitution may have certain civilising effects on official behaviour; even an 
authoritarian regime may look to constitutional devices to secure its legitimacy or 
effectiveness in practice.108 
An accurate understanding of the material constitution and its relation with 
the formal constitution offers important methodological insights for public and 
comparative constitutional lawyers. It prevents, for example, the collapse of the 
idea of constitutional change into the practice of formal constitutional 
amendment. Not every formal constitutional change is tantamount to a material 
transformation of the constitutional order, while constitutional transformations 
can also occur without any formal modification of the constitution. Two examples 
familiar to constitutional lawyers might help to assess the importance of the 
material constitution for constitutional studies. Switzerland enacted a new 
constitutional text in 1999. However, no one would suggest that this new 
document has brought about a material transformation of the constitutional 
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order.109 The main principles and objectives of the Swiss constitution remain the 
same.110 Conversely, significant constitutional change can occur without formal 
registration. During the fascist regime, although Italy was still formally governed 
by the Statuto Albertino (an octroyée and flexible constitution enacted in 1848), the 
material constitution had changed, giving rise to a new order which would be 
qualified by Italian public lawyers as such (regime fascista).111 The old constitution 
was still considered valid, but within a completely different constitutional order.112  
Furthermore, the relation between material and formal constitution can shed 
light on the contiguous issue of the scale of legitimate constitutional change. 
Several constitutions around the world (and many constitutional or supreme 
courts) have in recent decades introduced explicit limits to constitutional 
amendment. At times, these limits have been reconstructed or inferred by courts 
(and other institutions) by looking at the wider constitutional order. In this way, a 
notion of unconstitutional constitutional amendments has been forged in order to 
manage cases of conflict between core principles of the constitution and new 
constitutional amendments (often formally approved). 113  Of course, this is 
particularly problematic for constitutional orders based on a democratic form of 
government because the amendment to the constitution might have been 
approved by democratic means. Also, it is not clear how one might ground the 
limits to constitutional change in a purely normative way. The reference to a basic 
structure or the constitutional identity of a polity can indeed be conceived beyond 
formalism or normativism. The main tenets of the material constitution might 
have been codified in a formal document (often in preambles), 114  but they 
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represent essential pillars for the whole constitutional order and, accordingly, are 
key defining traits of its constitutional identity. Therefore, the material constitution 
is not ‘what happens’ in the sense of sheer occasionalism; rather it delineates the 
conditions which make possible the emergence of a state of affairs as a concrete 
constitutional order. Understanding these conditions makes it possible to draw a 
distinction between parts of a constitutional order whose change would be 
equivalent to the transformation of its identity and parts whose change, while 
important, could be seen as a reform or an augmentation of the constitutional 
order.  
The ordering forces thus stands in internal relation to the formal 
constitutional settlement. Their formation (and fragility) cannot be ignored 
because they breathe life into the constitutional order and condition its 
development. Each gives a sense of direction to constitutional norms. Law is not 
just the transmission belt of political decisions that are made before and outside 
the legal order.115 Neither is it an apolitical constraint on political action.  
The emphasis on ordering forces is not to suggest that order is easily attained 
within the material constitution. On the contrary, our insistence on movement, 
conflict, and dynamism should signal that the material constitution depends on a 
variety of forces, frequently oppositional, that combine in the process of political 
unification, institution-building, constructing social relations and pursuing 
fundamental political aims. For this reason, the constitution can be strengthened 
by institutionalising material contest, and even material conflict. But such conflict 
can become threatening, and existentially so.  
To understand this better, we can draw a distinction between two types of 
conflict and observe how they can be conceived from a material perspective. A 
first type of conflict, if properly institutionalised, can lead to further consolidation 
of the constitutional order. Constitutional order can be enhanced if it is able to 
manage conflict and display sensitivity to social forces, particularly those that 
could not have been foreseen at the moment in which the constitutional project 
was initiated. In this process constitutional order will also mould society, making 
space for new social instances and inputs, which in turn gives the material 
constitution some elasticity and durability. This does not mean that everything can 
be accommodated, but it does mean that the animating movement of the material 
constitution, with its cascading effects on institutions, can be enabled by a type of 
conflict management. These conflicts often involve pressure placed by social and 
political forces upon the boundaries of institutions and political/social subjects, 
and test their capacity to accommodate new claims. They need not challenge the 
fundamental political aims of the constitutional order nor necessarily give rise to 
new constitutional subjects but rather redirect the existing constitutional dynamic.  
A second type of conflict actually threatens the material constitution by 
testing the normative core supported by the dominant social and political forces. 
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This happens when the dominant forces are no longer able to exert pervasive 
effects throughout the political community. This might be the case when there is 
no longer coalescence around the same political aims or when there are internal 
contradictions among these aims and a compromise cannot be found. When this 
happens, conflicts cease to be productive for the constitution and a far-reaching 
change of the material (and formal) order becomes pressing. At this stage, the 
state of exception acts as a signal that the material constitution and the relative 
condensation of political and social forces which support it are under a serious 
threat of dissolution and an extraordinary intervention is required. In other words, 
the exception is not an unexpected event that threatens from outside the normality 
of the legal order; on the contrary, the exception surfaces from within, when the 
material constitution is under threat.116  
If the state of exception is considered legitimate when it aims at preserving 
the material constitution,117 it makes little sense to consider it an extra-juridical 
moment beyond the knowledge of constitutional lawyers. The same logic unfolds 
in other cases where the core of the material constitution is at stake. In the context 
of the European Union, for example, this became visible in the confrontation 
between highest national courts surrounding the penetration of EU law into 
national constitutional systems. Faced with the risk that certain measures provided 
for by EU law may unravel aspects of the social fabric and hence of core aspects 
of national constitutional identity, judges felt they had to set a threshold to be 
drawn along key constitutional principles.118 The development of the doctrine of 
‘counter-limits’ by some national constitutional courts can be read as an exercise 
of guardianship of core aspects of the Member State’s material constitution, 
bearing on political unity (national identity), institutional authority, and even social 
relations.119 Reference to the material (rather than the formal) constitution helps 
here in identifying the limits of constitutional revision or transformation. But this 
appeal to guardianship of the constitution may be made not only by constitutional 
courts, but other formal as well as informal actors, such as parliaments and even 
the people themselves, through social movements and political parties as well as 
referenda.  
Recognition of the material constitution has conspicuous consequences. It 
enriches constitutional enquiry by revealing the material relations between law, 
politics and society undergirding the formal constitution and permits study of the 
state of exception, or the doctrines of counter-limits and constitutional identity (as 
well as other liminal figures of constitutional law such as the constituent power) 
through its prism. The concept of the material constitution captures the internal 
                                                     
116 M. Croce, A. Salvatore, ‘After Exception: Carl Schmitt’s Legal Institutionalism and the 
Repudiation of Exceptionalism’ (2016) 29 Ratio Juris 410. 
117 Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law, above 280.  
118 See especially the Lisbon decision of the German Constitutional Court, BVerfG, 2 BE 
2/08, 30 June 2009. 
119 This doctrine has been developed by the German and the Italian constitutional courts: cf V 
Barsotti, P Carozza, M Cartabia, A Simoncini, Italian Constitutional Justice in the Global Context 
(Oxford University Press, 2016) 214-217. 
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relation between constitutional order and society without, however, eliding its 
conflictual and evolving nature. It is through this dynamic that constitutional 
change occurs. We have offered here an account of its four layers, the ‘ordering 
forces’ of the constitution and the relationships among them. If constitutional 
theory is to avoid the risk of becoming irrelevant in its abstractions, it will have to 
grapple with questions of material ordering and re-ordering. All the more so as we 
enter a period when formal constitutionalism is beginning to look divorced from 
constitutional reality, and constitutional order is, once again, threatened by radical 
change.  
 
 
 
 
